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program, Congress did not intend to allow claims under the FTCA for
wrongful termination of benefits. The court implied that, if a constitutional
violation does not warrant awarding monetary damages under the FTCA,
the wrongful termination of benefits likewise may not warrant awarding
monetary damages. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit court held that the
FTCA did not provide the plaintiff with a cause of action for the wrongful
termination of her husband's Social Security benefits.
SECURITIES
In Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1988), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether an arbitration
clause was enforceable to prevent litigation of a claim under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j(b) (1988),
and whether section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section
77q(a) (1988), provided a private right of action for fraud. In Neweome
the plaintiff, Newcome, hired the defendant, Esrey, a stockbroker, to invest
Newcome's stock portfolio at Esrey's discretion. Newcome signed a customer's agreement that provided for the arbitration of any controversy arising
out of Newcome's relationship with Esrey. Dissatisfied with Esrey's ability
to produce profits, Newcome sued Esrey for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty.
Newcome alleged that Esrey overtraded, or "churned," the securities
in Newcome's account solely to generate excessive commissions for Esrey.
Esrey defended on the grounds that section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 does not create a private cause of action and, alternatively, that
Newcome agreed to submit any claim to arbitration. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia, relying on Newman v.
Prior,518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975), ruled that section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 impliedly creates a private cause of action. The district court,
however, dismissed the suit, holding that, based upon section 17(a) and
section 10(b), Newcome had waived the right to pursue actions by agreeing
to arbitrate any claims.
Newcome appealed, arguing that neither the section 10(b) nor the section
17(a) claim was subject to the arbitration provision in the customer's
agreement. Initially, the Fourth Circuit relied on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 428 U.S. 220 (1987), which held that agreements
that subject section 10(b) claims to arbitration are valid, and affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Newcome's section 10(b) claim. The Fourth
Circuit then addressed whether Newcome's section 17(a) claim was subject
to the arbitration provision. In resolving this issue, the Newcome court first
considered whether section 17(a) creates a private cause of action. The
Fourth Circuit reviewed its holding in Newman v. Prior,518 F.2d 97 (4th
Cir. 1975), which stated that "section 17(a) supports a private damage claim
for the fraudulent sale of a security." The Newcome court noted, however,
that the Fourth Circuit reached the Newman decision without the benefit
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975).
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The Fourth Circuit examined the four factors listed in Cort that courts
are to use in determining whether a federal statute impliedly creates a private
cause of action. First, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff is a member
of the class of whose especial benefit Congress enacted the statute; that is,
that the statute creates a federal right of action for the plaintiff. Second,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the legislature intended to create a
private right of action. Third, the plaintiff must prove that implying a
private remedy is consistent with Congress's purpose in drafting the Securities Act of 1933. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that courts should
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law because the cause of
action is one not traditionally relegated to state law. The Newcome court
stated that the first three criteria of Cort, those criteria concerning the
indicia of legislative intent, were the primary factors for courts to consider
in deciding whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action
in section 17(a).
The Newcome court split its analysis of the legislative intent into two
parts. First, the court examined the language of section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act to determine whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy. The Fourth Circuit noted that, while section 17(a) characterizes the
listed conduct as "unlawful," the section is entirely silent as to enforcement.
The court also found that Congress expressly created private causes of
action for buyers of securities in other provisions of the 1933 Securities
Act. The Newcome court further reasoned that, because Congress drafted
section 17(a) as a general prohibition rather than as a benefit to a certain
class, courts should not imply a private right of action. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that, because some sections of the Securities Act of 1933 that
Congress passed in conjunction with section 17(a) contain private remedies
which address the same conduct and benefit the same class as section 17(a),
Congress specifically provided protection only to certain investors from
certain conduct. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress did not provide
any such protection for investors in section 17(a).
Second, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 to determine whether Congress intended to create a
private right of action for fraud in section 17(a). The Newcome court found
that section 17(a) was the result of a compromise between the House of
Representatives version and the Senate version of the Act. The Senate
version did not provide for civil liability. The House version also did not
provide for any civil remedy. The Newcome court thus concluded that the
lawmakers viewed section 17(a) as a general prohibition against fraudulent
conduct to be enforced by criminal and injunctive action, not by civil action.
Applying Cort's third indicator of legislative intent, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively regulates the securities
markets and includes a detailed procedure for enforcement. When the
Newcome court viewed section 17(a) against the other enforcement provisions of the Act, the court concluded that implying a right of action under
section 17(a) would interfere with the civil liabilities that Congress expressly
created. The Fourth Circuit also recognized that Congress imposed certain
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procedural restrictions upon plaintiffs who sue under other sections of the
Act. The Newcome court then noted that section 17(a) lacked any such
restrictions. The Fourth Circuit considered this lack of restrictions in section
17(a) as further evidence that implying a private right of action under
section 17(a) would be inconsistent with Congress's purpose in drafting the
1933 Securities Act. Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that Congress provided
investors a private right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j(b) (1988), which addresses conduct similar
to the conduct that section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits.
The Newcome court concluded that Congress provided investors with a
balanced system of remedies in drafting the federal securities laws. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that, if the court permitted plaintiffs to bring
negligence actions under section 17(a), plaintiffs could escape the procedural
limitations Congress specifically intended to apply to such actions. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that Newcome failed to prove that Congress
intended to create a private remedy under section 17(a) and that Newcome
failed to show that such a remedy would be consistent with the purpose of
the scheme of federal securities laws. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed
the district court's decision to dismiss Newcome's complaint.
In Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit
court considered, first, whether the district court erred in refusing to order
arbitration of federal claims under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
sections 77a-77bbbb (1988) (Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. sections 78a-78kk (1988) (Exchange Act), and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 1961-1968
(1988) (RICO); and second, whether the district court erred in compelling
arbitration of various state law claims. In Jeske an investor, Herbert A.
Jeske, began dealing with a stockbroker, George E. Brooks, in late January
1983. At that time Brooks was an employee of Robinson-Humphrey Company (Robinson-Humphrey), a subsidiary of Shearson-Lehman Brothers,
Inc. (Shearson-Lehman). In March 1983 Jeske signed a standard customer's
agreement with Brooks. The agreement contained an arbitration clause
covering all disputes over matters relating to the agreement.
Several months after Jeske signed the customer's agreement, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rule 15c2-2 (codified at 17
C.F.R. section 240.15c2-2(a) (1987), which made fraudulent a stockbroker's
act of binding a customer to the arbitration of future disputes between
them arising under the federal securities laws. Rule 15c2-2 took effect on
December 28, 1983. The SEC rescinded the rule effective October 21, 1987.
In 1986 the plaintiff, Jeske, filed suit against Brooks, Robinson-Humphrey, and Shearson-Lehman in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina. Jeske alleged that Brooks recommended
several unfit investments that resulted in losses and, therefore, that Jeske
was entitled to recovery under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the
SEC rules, and RICO. Jeske also asserted a variety of state law claims
against the defendants based on theories of fraud, breach of contract,
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negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the North Carolina
Securities Act and the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.
The defendants moved to stay litigation pending arbitration. The district
court ruled that Jeske's state law claims were arbitrable but that Jeske's
federal claims were not. The district court, therefore, compelled arbitration
of Jeske's state claims but refused to order arbitration of Jeske's federal
claims. Both Jeske and the defendants appealed.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit determined that,
while the parties' appeals were pending, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamus Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988),
called the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction into question. In Gulfstream the
Supreme Court abolished the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, which had provided
courts a basis of jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders granting or
denying motions to stay litigation pending arbitration. In Jeske, however,
the Fourth Circuit held that, despite Gulfstream, 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1)
(1982) enabled litigants to appeal orders denying stays pending arbitration
or refusing to compel arbitration. The Jeske court, however, observed that,
after Gulfstream, whether the court had jurisdiction to review orders compelling arbitration or staying legal proceedings pending arbitration still was
unclear.
The Fourth Circuit determined that Congress resolved the ambiguity
regarding the court's jurisdiction by amending the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. sections 1-14 (1988). The Jeske court explained that the amendment
to the Federal Arbitration Act specifies that the court does have jurisdiction
to consider an appeal from an order that refuses a stay pending arbitration
or from an order that denies a motion to compel arbitration. The Fourth
Circuit, however, noted that the amendment does not grant the court
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order that compels arbitration or that
grants a stay pending arbitration. Accordingly, the Jeske court addressed
the merits of the defendants' appeals that challenged the district court's
refusal to compel arbitration of the federal claims, but dismissed Jeske's
appeals that challenged the order to compel arbitration of Jeske's state law
claims.
In considering whether Jeske's federal claims were arbitrable, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), was controlling. The Jeske
court found that McMahon made clear that Jeske's federal claims under
RICO and the Exchange Act were arbitrable. The Fourth Circuit, however,
found that Jeske's Securities Act claim was more problematic. The Jeske
court observed that in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme
Court held that claims under the Securities Act were nonarbitrable. The
Fourth Circuit, however, noted that in McMahon the Supreme Court refused
to apply Wilko's holding to preclude arbitration of claims arising under the
Exchange Act. The Jeske court concluded that, although McMahon did not
expressly overrule Wilko, McMahon repudiated Wilko's rationale. Accordingly, the court concluded that Wilko no longer was good law with regard
to Wilko's holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are non-
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arbitrable. In Jeske, therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that all of Jeske's
federal claims were arbitrable.
Having found Jeske's federal claims arbitrable, the Fourth Circuit
addressed Jeske's claim that the arbitration clause in the parties' agreement
was invalid and, therefore, that the court had no basis for compelling
arbitration. Jeske's argument was twofold. First, Jeske asserted that the
SEC's adoption of rule 15c2-2 rendered the arbitration clause void. Second,
Jeske argued that the general agreement itself was void for lack of consideration and because of overreaching, unconscionability, and fraud in the
inducement of the agreement. In rejecting Jeske's first argument the Fourth
Circuit found that rule 15c2-2 did not nullify the arbitration clause. The
Jeske court explained that because the SEC had rescinded rule 15c2-2 the
arbitration clause did not conflict with the SEC rule. The Fourth Circuit
court recognized that the SEC did not rescind rule 15c2-2 until after Jeske
filed suit against the defendants. Nevertheless, the Jeske court decided to
give retroactive effect to rule 15c2-2's rescission.
The Fourth Circuit noted that three other circuits already had applied
rule 15c2-2's rescission retroactively. Moreover, the Jeske court stated that
the usual rule is that courts should decide federal cases under the law
existing at the time of the decision. The Fourth Circuit conceded that courts
should not decide federal cases under existing law if a change in the law
unfairly disrupts a litigant's course of conduct or reasonable expectations.
The court, however, concluded that in Jeske no injustice would result if
the court retroactively applied rule 15c2-2's rescission. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that Jeske could not have relied on rule 15c2-2 because the SEC
did not adopt the rule until eight months after Jeske entered into the
customer's agreement with the defendants. Moreover, the court concluded
that no evidence showed that Jeske would not have signed the agreement
had Jeske known that his securities claims would be arbitrable. Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit held that because the SEC had rescinded rule 15c2-2 the
arbitration clause in the customer's agreement was valid.
In considering Jeske's second argument that the arbitration clause was
invalid because the general agreement itself was void for lack of consideration and faults in the inducement of the agreement, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that, because the alleged defects pertained to the entire contract
rather than specifically to the arbitration clause, the court should leave the
alleged defects to the arbitrator for resolution. In Jeske, therefore, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the portion of the district court judgment that
refused to compel arbitration of Jeske's federal claims under RICO, the
Securities Act, and the Exchange Act, and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to compel arbitration of Jeske's federal claims and
to stay litigation of the federal claims pending arbitration. Having found
that the Fourth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's
order compelling arbitration of Jeske's various state-law claims, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed Jeske's appeals.
In Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 792
(1990), the Fourth Circuit considered, first, whether certificates of deposit
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are "securities" within the meaning of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78a-78kk (1988) (Exchange Act), and second,
whether the district court erred in refusing to consider the plaintiffs' claims
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 15
U.S.C. sections 1961-1968 (1988) (RICO). In Tafflin the Maryland legislature
designated a single judge in the Baltimore City Circuit Court to hear all
claims arising out of conservatorship or receivership proceedings for failed
savings and loan associations. Additionally, after the collapse of Maryland
Savings and Share Insurance Corporation (MSSIC), a state-chartered corporation created to insure accounts in Maryland that were not federally
insured, the legislature created a successor to MSSIC, the Maryland Deposit
Insurance Fund (MDIF). Accordingly, after Old Court Savings and Loan
(Old Court) collapsed, the Baltimore City Circuit Court converted the
conservatorship into a recievership, with MDIF serving as the receiver.
MDIF expressly stated that it would not compensate owners of Old Court
certificates of deposit for interest accruing after November 8, 1985. Moreover, MDIF stated that, as to interest accruing before November 8, 1985,
it would pay interest to owners at interest rates lower that the rates prescribed
in the certificates of deposit. Consequently, the plaintiffs, purchasers and
holders of Old Court certificates of deposit, filed suit against MDIF, MSSIC,
Old Court, and counsel to MSSIC and Old Court in the United States
District Court for the District of Baltimore, Maryland.
The plaintiffs in Tafflin alleged causes of action arising under the
Exchange Act and RICO. The district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege a claim under
the Exchange Act. The district court reasoned that certificates of deposit
were not "securities" within the meaning of the Exchange Act. Moreover,
the district court refrained from considering the RICO claim because the
plaintiffs also had raised the RICO claim in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether certificates of deposit
were "securities" within the meaning of the Exchange Act. To resolve the
issue, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the United States Supreme Court decision
in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). In Marine Bank the
Supreme Court held that long-term certificates of deposit that federally
insured banks issue are not "securities" within the meaning of the Exchange
Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that certificates of deposit that federally
insured banks issue are subject to comprehensive regulations which sufficiently protect the rights of purchasers and, therefore, make the application
of the Exchange Act unnecessary. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Tafflin
determined that the Exchange Act does not apply if comprehensive regulations govern issuers of certificates of deposit. Finding that the regulations
governing the Maryland savings and loans were intensive, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Old Court certificates of deposit were not "securities" within
the meaning of the Exchange Act and, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not
have a cause of action under the Exchange Act.
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The Fourth Circuit next considered whether the district court properly
abstained from deciding the plaintiffs' RICO claims. To resolve the issue
of whether state courts can consider RICO violations, the court relied on
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th
Cir. 1988). In Brandenburg the Fourth Circuit held that state courts have
jurisdiction to consider RICO violations. The Brandenburg court reasoned
that if comprehensive regulations govern a state chartered institution, a
federal court properly may decline jurisdiction over a RICO claim. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Tafflin affirmed the district court's decision to
allow the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to consider the plaintiff's RICO
claims.
On May 30, 1989, the United States Supreme Court granted the defendants certiorari with review limited to the question of whether a state court
can hear a RICO claim. Tafflin v. Levitt, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989). In
considering whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO
claims, the Supreme Court observed that, unless a statute expressly or
impliedly grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, state courts are
presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction. Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792
(1990). In Tafflin the Supreme Court, however, noted that under Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), the presence of any
one of three factors can rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction:
explicit statutory directive, unmistakable implication from legislative history,
or clear incompatibility between state jurisdiction and federal interests.
The Tafflin Court then proceeded to analyze whether any of these
factors were present in the RICO statute. The Supreme Court in Tafflin
first observed that RICO grants permissive jurisdiction to federal courts
and that RICO contains no language to suggest that Congress intended
federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over RICO claims. Consequently, RICO contains no explicit statutory directive that would exempt
RICO from the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Next, the Supreme
Court reviewed RICO's legislative history, finding no indication that Congress even considered the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims.
Accordingly, the Tafflin Court determined that RICO's legislative history,
by its silence, failed to exempt RICO from the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction. Finally, in considering whether state jurisdiction over civil RICO
claims is clearly incompatible with federal interests, the Supreme Court
noted that because civil RICO claims do not involve criminal sanctions,
allowing state courts concurrent jurisdiction poses no significant danger that
federal criminal law will be applied inconsistently. While the Tafflin Court
conceded that the defendants legitimately were concerned about the need
for consistency in applying federal criminal law, the Court stated that
federal courts would remain fully responsible for interpreting and applying
federal criminal laws, thus alleviating the defendants' concern. Additionally,
the Court stated that federal interpretations of relevant federal criminal
statutes guide state courts adjudicating civil RICO claims, and thus, state
court adjudications of civil RICO claims only would affect negligibly the
uniform interpretation and application of federal criminal law. Furthermore,

